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Inflation can alter the characteristics of tax- and contribution systems in numerous ways. This 
paper demonstrates how inflation alters the distributive properties of nominally defined tax 
systems and looks at the impact of the tax revenues and social insurance contribution receipts 
generated. It provides quantitative estimates for Germany, The Netherlands and the UK, using 
a preliminary version of EUROMOD, a European tax-benefit microsimulation model. The 
integrated framework provided by the model permits the use of common income concepts 
across countries and therefore enables one to make informative comparisons of the 
distributive consequences of the inflation induced erosion of tax-band limits, thresholds, 
deductions, tax credits, etc. The paper also tests the performance of automatic indexing 





Der Einfluss von Inflation auf Einkommensteuer- 




Inflation kann zu Veränderungen der Eigenschaften und der Wirksamkeit von 
Abgabensystemen fuehren. Dieser Beitrag analysiert, wodurch und in welchem Ausmass 
Inflation die Verteilungs- und Aufkommenscharacteristiken von Einkommensteuer und 
Sozialversicherungsabgaben beeinflusst. Mithilfe einer Vorabversion eines neuartigen 
europäischen Steuer-Beihilfen Mikrosimulations-modells (EUROMOD) werden die 
quantitativen Auswirkungen in Deutschland, den Niederlanden und Grossbritannien 
untersucht. Das Modell erlaubt unter anderem die Verwendung identischer 
Einkommenskonzepte für die verschiedenen Länder. Dadurch werden informative 
Ländervergleiche hinsichtlich der Verteilungsauswirkungen einer inflationsbedingten 
Aushöhlung von Progressionsstufengrenzen, Frei-, Absetz- sowie Absetzbeträgen möglich. 
Der Beitrag analysisert ausserdem die Wirksamkeit der automatischen 
Steuerindexierungsverfahren, welche in zwei der betrachteten Ländern Anwendung finden. 
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During the last three decades, the distinction between nominal and real variables has become 
firmly established not only in economic but also in political and public discourse. The 
attention and media coverage prompted regularly by the release of new inflation figures make 
widespread money illusion unlikely, even at low rates of inflation. Despite this general 
awareness, many tax rules still employ the "nominal view" of the world. This paper 
demonstrates how inflation alters distributive properties of nominally defined tax systems and 
looks at the impact of the tax revenues and social insurance contribution receipts generated. It 
aims to provide quantitative estimates using a preliminary version of EUROMOD, a European 
tax-benefit microsimulation model. 
 
A large literature on the effects of inflation on taxation emerged in the 1970s and early 1980s 
when inflation was high. However, the topic has received much less attention since the 
widespread decline of inflation rates in the mid 1980s. It is largely still true that “the effect of 
inflation on the progressivity of the income tax system is important and noteworthy, but 
usually overlooked”.
2 This is especially the case for European countries, where, during the last 
few years, concerns about deflation have sometimes pushed inflation, and the costs associated 
with it, off the headlines. There are, however, several reasons why a renewed interest in the 
topic seems justified, especially in Europe: 
(1)  Even the currently experienced levels of inflation can result in marked distortions of tax 
liabilities. As will become apparent in this study, infrequent adjustments of the tax system 
for “fiscal drag” can cause very significant additional tax burdens; 
(2) Measures to neutralise inflation induced distortions of taxation are economically less 
costly during times of low inflation. They are also politically more feasible because (a) 
the associated loss in real tax revenues is smaller; and (b) adjusting the tax system for 
changes in the general price level will be less prone to be interpreted as "defeat" in the 
fight against inflation if the rate of inflation is low. 
(3)  For EMU countries, the loss of control over monetary policy means that there is less 
scope for national policy makers to control inflation. As long as there remain important 
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2 Bailey (1976), p. 296.  2 
structural differences between different EMU countries, one would expect a unified 
monetary policy to lead to differing price developments across countries. Indeed, the 
process of “convergence” can itself contribute to such differences (European 
Commission, 1999). Small countries may be particularly affected since their economic 
situation will frequently receive less attention in the determination of monetary policy 
than that of larger countries. To the extent that the properties of national tax and 
contribution systems are influenced by inflation, a loss of influence on inflation will also 
reduce national policymakers' control over fiscal policy parameters. 
 
The paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 considers different kinds of taxes and discusses 
to what extent they are affected by inflation. The remainder of the paper limits its scope to the 
effects of inflation on the taxation of income. Section 3 briefly reviews the different channels 
through which inflation affects income tax burdens and discusses possible consequences for 
the distribution of incomes and tax burdens. Section 4 proceeds with a brief description of the 
model used in the simulations. Section 5 explains the simulated scenarios and discusses the 
results while section 6 concludes suggesting possible ways to extend the present analysis. 
 
2.  Tax bases affected by inflation 
 
A nominally defined tax base will be affected in one of the following ways: 
 
For excise taxes, fees, fines, etc. where the payable amount is calculated in relation to the 
number of transactions rather than their value, the nominal tax liability remains unaffected by 
inflation.  Thus, the real value of the tax decreases with rising price levels.  The same is true 
for taxes with a historical tax base.  Examples are wealth and inheritance taxes where the tax 
base is not or only infrequently unadjusted.  In a similar fashion, inflation reduces the real 
value of historically defined or otherwise fixed deductions, allowances and tax credits.  In 
these cases, however, this causes real tax burdens to increase. 
 
If the tax is computed as a fraction of changes in nominal values, inflation will also lead to 
increasing effective tax rates.  The most important example here is the capital gains tax.  A tax 
base is not affected by inflation if the tax is a fraction of a transaction's value at the time of the 
transaction (ad valorem taxes, VAT).  For changing general price levels, the tax changes in 
line with the nominal value of the underlying transaction.  Thus, the real value of the tax 
liability remains unchanged. 
 
This paper's focus on the taxation of income is a direct result of the relative sensitivities of 
different tax bases with respect to inflation.  In most industrialised countries, taxes on 
consumption either represent only a small part of total tax revenue (excise taxes) or are 
unaffected by inflation (value added taxes, ad-valorem taxes).  Furthermore, the mechanics of 
the distortion of excise taxes are relatively straightforward while taxes on income are affected 
in a multitude of different ways. 
 
3.  Inflation induced distortions of the income tax 
 
The channels through which changes in the general price level affect real tax burdens can be 
categorised as follows (for convenience, this section uses the term “income tax” to refer to all 
kinds of taxes and contributions levied on income): 
(1)  Influence on the real value of tax liabilities already owed.  3 
(2)  Influence on the tax base. 
(3)  Influence on the tax schedule. 
 
3.1.  Distortion of existing tax liabilities 
 
This most obvious distortion of real tax burdens is caused by collection lags, which, for 
income tax liabilities in particular, can be sizeable. If not corrected, the reduction of tax 
burdens due to collection lags leads to an unequal tax treatment between pay-as-you-earn and 
self-assessing taxpayers. Monthly or quarterly tax pre-payments can, however, reduce this 
effect to a large extent. 
 
3.2.  Distortion of the tax base 
 
If one accepts the definition of income which has become known as the Haig-Simons (H-S) 
income concept then income earned in a certain period is equal to the change in the power to 
consume.
3 The typical tax code, however, uses the term income rather ambiguously: Usually, 
a concept like "adjusted gross income" is the closest approximation to H-S income one can 
find. Frequently, some or all non-monetary income components (in-kind fringe benefits, 
unrealised capital gains and "implicit" incomes such as the benefits derived from owner-
occupied housing or other durables) remain untaxed. But some types of money income, such 
as unemployment benefits, are often also excluded from the tax base. The taxation of nominal 
rather than real income adds to this list of deviations from H-S income: A nominally defined 
income tax base ignores changes of the potential to consume which are a direct result of 
                                                            
3Haig (1921); and Simons (1938). 
Box 1. Inflation induced tax base distortions. 
 
Ignoring gains and losses due to changes in the value of money leads to unequal tax burdens for equal 
amounts of (H-S) income, depending on how and when it is earned. Inflation is, per definition, a time 
dependent phenomenon. It potentially affects all tax rules that determine tax liabilities on the basis of 
values denominated in previous periods’ currency units. These rules include the taxation of capital gains 
and, related to the first, the tax treatment of interest income and expenses. Not adjusting the tax base for 
the change in value caused by the erosion of the currency in which nominal assets and liabilities are 
denominated often causes very substantial tax distortions. For example, if nominal gains are taxed at a 
rate of 30%, then an asset bought for 1,000 in 1998 and then sold for 1,050 in the following year, would 
be subject to a tax of 15 (in 1999 currency units). If inflation during the same period was 4% then the 
real capital gain was only 10. The real effective tax rate is thus 150%, a rate which can hardly be 
justified on economic grounds. Similarly, for nominal rates of return less than inflation but greater than 
zero even real losses are subject to capital gains tax. 
 
To compensate for the effects of inflation, all transactions relevant for the calculation of value gains and 
losses have to be valued at current prices, i.e., both current and reference value of the asset have to be 
assessed using current money. For tax authorities and taxpayers, this means an additional layer in the 
computation of taxes. The administrative implementation of correcting capital gains for inflation has, for 
example, been described "as one of the most severe practical problems facing the implementation of the 
pure income tax base" (Beach et al., 1988, p. 104). Although indexation does require accounting systems 
and procedures, which are capable of providing the necessary additional information, most of the 
essential data (the relevant time periods over which inflation adjustments have to be made) are already 
collected as part of the conventional tax assessment procedure. In the UK, for instance, capital gains 
subject to tax have, until 1998, been adjusted for inflation.  4 
changes in the purchasing power of money (see Box 1). 
 
3.3.  Distortions of the tax schedule 
 
Similarly to the effects discussed under heading 3.1, this type of distortion is also independent 
of the tax base. It exists for all taxes (or contributions; or other levies) that are non-
proportional and where tax brackets, allowances, deductions or tax credits are defined in 
nominal terms. A nominally defined progressive tax schedule subjects higher nominal 
incomes to higher tax rates. During times of inflation, this results in ever increasing tax rates 
for constant real incomes (“bracket creep”). The extent to which inflation causes the real tax 
burden of a given taxpayer to rise is determined by: 
 
1.  the rate of inflation; 
2.  the average tax rate; and 
3.  the progressivity of the tax schedule. Since the resulting change in the tax burden depends 
on where the taxpayer is located in the income scale, it is a “local” concept of 
progressivity that is relevant here.
4 This progressivity, in turn, depends on: 
a)  the shape of the relevant section of the (statutory) tax schedule (i.e., the number, size, 
and location of tax bands); and 
b)  the number and size of nominally fixed deductions, allowances and tax credits. 
 
For the economy is a whole, then, the increase in the overall tax burden also depends on the 
vertical distribution of the tax base among taxpayers. 
 
The move into higher tax brackets due to inflation is equivalent to an automatic tax increase, 
which (1) varies with inflation and (2) has not been explicitly approved by the usual political 
process and is therefore less apparent to the public (“taxation without representation”). It may, 
thus, be tempting for policy makers to exploit the mechanism as a convenient way to finance 
increased public spending. 
  
Apart from the two trivial solutions to the problem (price stability or a proportional tax 
schedule) several methods have been proposed to reduce the responsiveness of the effective 
tax rate to changes in the price level. The most widely used pragmatic approach is a 
discretionary adjustment of the tax schedule in more or less regular intervals. The biggest 
problem with this solution is that it does not avoid the additional tax revenue that builds up in-
between adjustments. Furthermore, discretionary changes, especially if they come at 
unpredictable intervals, affect the continuity of the tax system.  Finally, these adjustments of 
the tax schedule can be (and frequently are) presented to the electorate as tax decreases even if 
they only prevent the tax burden from rising further. There have, for these reasons, been 
several attempts to introduce more exact and permanent inflation adjustments:
5 
 
(1)  A general decrease of tax rates as the general price level increases. This approach can 
prevent increases in the total tax revenue but not changes in the distribution of tax 
burdens (for instance, low real incomes which have originally been exempted from 
income tax will still become taxable by being pushed out of the zero-tax bracket). 
 
                                                            
4 One such “local” measure of progression is dt(y) / dy = (m(y) – t(y)) / y, where t is the average tax rate, m is the 
marginal tax rate and y is the tax base. 
5See Messere (1998), p. 13 or Tanzi (1976).  5 
(2)  Deduction from the tax base of that part of nominal income, which is due to inflation. 
This method causes the nominal taxable income to remain constant while the real taxable 
income decreases. It will, therefore, overcompensate for the effects of inflation. 
(3)  Deflating taxable income to some base period. The tax schedule of this base year is then 
applied to the deflated income. The resulting tax liability is then inflated back to current 
period.  This (rather complicated) method prevents inflation induced distortions of the tax 
schedule. It has been used in several Swiss Cantons (federal indexation was introduced in 
1985).
6 
(4)  Continually adjusting tax brackets, deductions, allowances and exemptions for inflation 
("indexing"). Several variants have been proposed and/or adopted: 
(a)  Full adjustment (e.g., Canada from 1974 to the mid-1980s, UK from 1981/82, USA 
since 1985).  This approach, if applied continuously, neutralises distortions of the tax 
schedule and is equivalent to method (3) above. 
(b)  Partial adjustment.  From 1983, the Canadian income tax schedule has, for example, 
been adjusted only for that part of inflation which exceeds 3%. Economically, this 
approach would, for example, make sense if the index used to measure inflation for 
the purpose of adjustment is believed to overstate actual inflation. The partial 
adjustment approach has also been used to retain a certain degree of discretionary 
control (e.g., in the Netherlands). 
(c)  Triggered indexation (1):  Adjustments are only applied if annual inflation exceeds 
some predetermined threshold. 
(d)  Triggered indexation (2):  Adjustments are only applied if the accumulated changes 
in the general price level since the last adjustment exceeds some predetermined level. 
(e)  "Stand-by" Indexing.  Requires the degree of adjustment of the tax schedule for 
inflation to be determined by the parliament every year, enforcing an annual public 
debate of the issue.  Decisions not to adjust the tax schedule (to the full extent of 
inflation) have to be justified as such.  It is, thus, more difficult for the government to 
exploit the fiscal drag as a means for hidden tax increases. 
(f)  Any combinations of (a) to (e). 
(5)  “Super-indexing”.  In the literature, the term usually refers to an adjustment of the tax 
schedule to changes in national nominal income.  If the tax brackets, allowances, 
deductions, etc. are adjusted for the rate of inflation, then one implicitly accepts 
increasing tax revenues relative to national income as a result of increasing real incomes.  
In rapidly growing economies, this effect can be particularly pronounced.  In the Federal 
Republic of Germany, tax revenues as a share of national income rose from 5.14% (1958) 
to 7.55% (1963) and 10.6% (1975). In its earlier period of rapid growth, Japan adopted a 
form of annual discretionary adjustment of the income tax schedule and/or rates to avoid 
increases of a similar extent. Examples for tax systems where super-indexing has been 
introduced in the past are Iceland (in 1966) and Denmark (1974; discontinued in 1983).
7 
 
3.4. Distributive  Effects 
 
The interaction of inflation and a nominally defined tax system causes both unequal tax 
burdens for similar incomes, and changes in the vertical distribution of tax burdens. Following 
the structure of this section so far, I will in turn discuss the distributive impact of distortions 
of existing tax liabilities, distortions of the tax base and distortions of the tax schedule. 
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The distributive effects of delayed collections of income taxes are straightforward. The 
relative change of the average tax rate as a consequence of delayed tax payments is the same 
for all tax rates (and, thus, incomes).  The impact on after-tax income, however, rises with the 
taxpayer's average tax rate: Individuals with incomes below the tax threshold, for instance, do 
not at all benefit from delayed tax payments.  In general, delayed tax payments will therefore 
have a distributive impact that works against the progression built into the tax schedules. The 
more progressive the schedule, the more regressive the effects of delayed tax collection. 
 
There have, to my knowledge, been no empirical studies incorporating the distributive effects 
of the inflation distortions of both tax schedule and tax base. Any study analysing the 
distortions of the tax schedule in isolation implicitly does, of course, assume that the income 
on which individuals pay tax does not change between the no-inflation and inflation scenarios. 
This, however, is only the case if the tax base is adjusted for inflation. The results of studies 
ignoring the distortions of inflation must be interpreted with caution since the changes in 
effective tax rates following distortions of the tax base can be much bigger than those due to 
bracket creep.
8  The reason why, despite the importance of base distortions, studies (including 
this one) have concentrated on the distributive effects of distorted tax schedules is probably 
twofold. Indexing the tax schedule is much less complicated than adjusting the tax base for 
inflation. As a consequence, many countries have actually implemented measures to index the 
tax schedule providing an immediate motivation for empirical studies regarding the 
distribution effects of the new measure. On the other hand, no country has, so far, attempted a 
comprehensive inflation adjustment of the tax base. Secondly, an analysis of the distribution 
effect of a policy requires a comparison of the status quo with a hypothetical scenario.  In the 
bracket creep case this is relatively easy to accomplish because all the necessary information 
to compute the alternative scenario (a representative sample of personal or business income, 
tax band limits, allowances, tax credits and the rate of inflation) are readily available.  For 
measures to adjust the tax base for inflation, this is not the case.  Much more data are needed 
to establish the impact of inflation on the different components of income. Most of the 
required data relate to wealth and income from capital. On a household-by-household basis, 
this type of information is notoriously hard to come by.  In most cases, income surveys do not 
contain the required data at the necessary level of detail.  Even if they do, responses to survey 
questions relating to wealth tend to be unreliable. In the present study, the analysis will, for 
these reasons, also be limited to the impact of inflation induced distortions of the tax schedule. 
 
Although previous studies have, therefore, not been able to provide clear-cut answers, the 
distributive effects would clearly depend on the distribution of income from capital. Only the 
effective tax rates on income from capital are directly affected by inflation induced distortions 
of the tax base.
9 In as far as inflation leads to a higher effective tax rate on these incomes and 
assuming that income from capital represents a higher fraction of overall income for 
individuals higher up the income distribution, the overall effect would tend to be progressive - 
which would reduce or possibly even over-compensate the regressive effects of delayed tax 
payments and bracket creep.
10 Other authors have argued that overall, wage earners tend to be 
more negatively affected.
11 Wage earners cannot easily delay their tax payments while capital 
gains taxes can, for example, be delayed for a very long time if they are not payable when they 
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10see Halperin and Steuerle (1989). 
11see, for example, Petrei (1975); Bossons and Wilson (1973).  7 
accrue but upon realisation. By timing the realisation of capital gains, earners of income from 
capital would also have more discretion over their tax burden. Turning to the impact of taxing 
inflated interest payments, it can be said that the main losers are those who draw their income 
from savings while net debtors will frequently benefit from the deductibility of nominal 
interest expenses.  If low-income earners are more limited in the amounts they can borrow, it 
is likely that they will be hurt to a larger extent. 
".... failure to properly deal with inflation in the imposition of taxes has been particularly 
inequitable to the older, often poor people who must live on fixed incomes. It is not so 
much the young, aggressive consumer, starting out in life or the recently established 
business or, for that matter, the profligate individual or corporation, but rather the 
individual and the business concern that, through savings and good administration were 
able to accumulate capital, that suffer the most from inflation."
12 
As is the case for delayed tax payments, the distortions of the tax schedule due to "bracket 
creep" also depend on the progressiveness of the schedule.  Here, relative changes in the tax 
burden are not the same for all incomes. The taxpayers most affected are those whose incomes 
fall into the more progressive parts of the schedule.  In other words, the size of the tax 
increase caused by bracket creep depends on the taxpayer's marginal and average tax rate 
which, in turn, depend on taxable income and number and width of tax bands as well as the 
size of any allowances, deductions and tax credits. If average and marginal tax rates are the 
same, meaning that the relevant section of the schedule is "flat", then the taxpayer is not 
affected at all.  The bottom and middle parts of the income tax is normally more progressive 
than the top.  Inflation induced distortions of the tax schedule would therefore tend to affect 
high incomes to a lesser extent.  For progressive tax schedules, the downward shift (in real 
terms) of tax band limits and the reduced real value of (flat amount-) tax credits will increase 
the real tax burdens for all taxpayers.  For the highest incomes, however, the resulting 
increase in the average tax rate will be smaller because the tax rate by which the majority of 
their income is taxed (the top rate) will remain unchanged.  Also, the value of tax credits is 
likely to be small relative to the overall tax burden.  For taxpayers on smaller incomes, on the 
other hand, it will, in terms of the tax burden, make a larger difference if part of their income 
is taxed at higher rates due to bracket creep - and tax credits will have a larger relative 
influence on their overall tax bill. Special tax credits and allowances are frequently used to 
increase the disposable income of certain targeted groups such lone parents, pensioners, 
people with disabilities, families with children, etc. One would therefore expect these groups 
to suffer disproportionately from non-indexation (the extent to which such targeted groups 
suffer from inflation will be aggravated if applicable benefit payments are not uprated either). 
In addition, some individuals with real incomes too low to be taxable (before prices went up) 
will, despite unchanged real incomes, slip out of the zero-rate tax band and become taxable. 
Empirical studies have tended to confirm the regressive nature of bracket creep. They also 
show that the average tax rate increases for all income groups and that discretionary 
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4.  The Model 
 
I use a preliminary version of EUROMOD to compute disposable incomes, income taxes and 
compulsory social insurance contributions paid by “employees” (EESICs)
14 for a 
representative sample of households in Germany, The Netherlands and the UK. 
 
EUROMOD is an integrated European tax-benefit model, which, at the time of writing, is 
under construction. EUROMOD provides us with a Europe-wide perspective on social and 
fiscal policies that are implemented at European, national or regional level. It is also designed to 
examine, within a consistent comparative framework, the impact of national policies on national 
populations or the differential impact of co-ordinated European policy on individual Member 
States. See Immervoll et al. (1999) for more details. 
 
Microdata for the Netherlands are from the 1996 wave of the Socio-Economic Panel (SEP). 
Households with large amounts of missing information are excluded, bringing the sample to 
4568 households. For the UK we use the 1995/6 Family Expenditure Survey. No observations 
are excluded since the sample contains no households with significant missing information. 
There are 6797 UK households. The data used for Germany is the 1996 wave of the German 
Socio-economic Panel (SOEP) with a sample size of 6894. In each case, the samples are 
weighted to adjust for non-response bias and to bring the results up to population levels. The 
simulations are based on the systems of tax and benefit rules current in June 1998 and the 
income variables in the micro-data are updated using the consumer price index (GE, NL) and 
the retail price index (UK).
15 
 
Given the limitations of the underlying data, not all the relevant components of the respective 
tax-benefit systems lend themselves to simulation. I simulate income taxes, social insurance 
contributions, child benefits and other family benefits, and income-tested benefits. In 
computing income, components that are not simulated in the model are taken directly from the 
data (i.e. it is assumed that they are unaffected by switching between different policy 
scenarios). In particular, this is the case for contribution based payments, such as 
unemployment benefits or contributory pensions. Appendix 1 lists the specific instruments 
that have been simulated. 
 
The microsimulation approach allows one to examine the effects of inflation in isolation from 
other changes in the structure of the underlying population or its characteristics. In addition it 
permits focusing on particular elements of the tax-benefit system. In this case, we are 
interested in the effects of inflation on taxes (including contributions) paid on income. These 
effects are explored by uprating all monetary variables
16 in the micro-data by a range of 
hypothetical and actual inflation rates while (a) keeping the rules describing the income tax 
and EESICs nominally fixed; and (b) making adjustments that reflect the uprating regime 
which applies to income taxes and EESICs in the respective country. All simulated and non-
                                                            
14 All contributions which are not paid by the employer. In this paper, EESICs therefore include contribution 
payments of employees, self-employed persons, benefit recipients, pensioners, etc. 
15 The full version of EUROMOD will permit the application of different uprating factors for each of the main 
types of income. 
16 Relative prices are, thus, assumed to be unaffected. This assumption follows from the aim of the simulations to 
isolate the effects of changes in the general price level from other changes.  9 





5.  Simulated Scenarios and Results 
 
For each country, the following scenarios are explored: 
1.  Hypothetical inflation rates of 3%, 5%, 10% with tax- and EESIC rules fixed in nominal 
terms.
19 
2.  Actual inflation rates of the 1992-1998 period. 
A. Income tax- and EESIC rules fixed in nominal terms. 
B. Income tax- and EESIC rules adjusted according to uprating regime in place. 
 
As discussed above, the overall distributive and revenue effects of inflation depend on the 
structure of the tax- and contribution systems and the distribution of the tax- and contribution 
base in the population. Appendix 2 briefly describes the income tax and EESIC systems as 
they existed in the three countries. One clear difference is obvious from figures 9-11. For the 
largest part of taxable incomes, the German income tax schedule is continuous rather than 
piece-wise linear. As a consequence, inflation leads to rising marginal tax rates for almost all 
taxpayers. In addition, the lowest marginal rate (about 26%) is higher than in both the other 
two countries. The Dutch tax schedule is also quite steep, but the largest increase in marginal 
tax rates occurs at a much higher level of taxable income. The UK schedule is the flattest 
among the three. All three EESIC systems exhibit regressive characteristics, albeit to differing 
extents. 
 
Turning to the distribution of the tax base, it is evident that in Germany, a large proportion of 
those with positive taxable incomes are concentrated in the “tax-free” part of the schedule. As 
a percentage of the number of taxpayers, about 4.5% are less than 10% below the tax-
threshold. There is, thus, considerable scope for inflation to push large numbers of people 
across the threshold into tax liability. In The Netherlands also, a large part of taxpayers is 
located in the more progressive part of the schedule. Of course, even those taxpayers who are 
in the top-rate bracket suffer average tax rate increases caused by the extremely large increase 
in marginal rates from 7.1% to 50%: If inflation is allowed to erode the tax band limits, a 
larger proportion of their income is taxable at 50%. 
 
5.1.  Hypothetical inflation rates 
 
Table 1 shows the real revenue effects of not adjusting income tax and EESIC rules for three 
different rates of inflation. It is apparent from these figures that the revenue effects of not 
adjusting tax and contribution parameters for inflation can cause substantial revenue changes. 
What is also immediately obvious, is that some simulated figures match their official 
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inflation. Note that this does not necessarily mean that the real value of these instruments will remain unchanged. 
Due to interactions between benefit instruments and the (changing) income tax and EESIC rules, benefit amounts 
may actually be influenced indirectly. One advantage of tax-benefit models is that they are capable of taking 
these interactions into account. 
18 In practice, uprating of benefit rules is not usually as comprehensive as simulated here. Even if benefits are 
said to be “adjusted for inflation”, this adjustment is often incomplete (Trade Union Congress, 1999). 
19 Only the results of the 5% scenario are presented here. Results for the other two scenarios can be obtained 
from the author upon request.  10 
counterparts quite well while others (UK income tax in particular) are less satisfactory. There 
are numerous reasons why one would expect deviations. Aggregate figures generated by a tax-
benefit model may be hard to reconcile with official figures because of differences in 
underlying concepts and definitions. Data related issues include the scope of the underlying 
micro-data, under-/over-representation of specific groups of individuals, under-reporting of 
certain items, distortions introduced by the uprating methods used to bring the data from the 
original year to the policy year, etc. In addition, the model’s tax-benefit algorithms themselves 
may bias aggregate results. Examples are simplifying assumptions made in building the 
algorithms and less than perfect modelling of individual choices such as optimising behaviour 
(tax avoidance), tax evasion and benefit take-up. In the case of UK income tax, an important 
factor contributing to the shortfall of simulated tax receipts is the under-representation of high 
incomes in the Family Expenditure Survey. This downward bias is significantly aggravated by 
the widening of the income distribution which took place between 1995/6 (the data year) and 
1998/9 which is not accounted for in the uprating procedure used for the simulations 
presented here. This explanation is consistent with the very good match of social insurance 




The Dutch income tax system exhibits the largest elasticity of real tax revenue with respect to 
nominal incomes. The main reason is the large jump in the marginal tax rate between the 
bottom (7.1%) and middle (50%) tax band mentioned before. However, compared to EESICs, 
income tax revenues are relatively less important in The Netherlands than in the other two 
countries. In The Netherlands, the overall contribution rate for employees is almost 39%. The 
inflation-induced erosion of the upper contribution limits therefore has a larger negative 
impact on EESIC revenues than in the cases of Germany or the UK. 
 
Who pays for the revenue increases and who benefits from any decreases in real tax burdens? 
In terms of the impact on household incomes, the changes have a clearly progressive effect. 
This is illustrated by figure 1, which shows the changes in real household disposable incomes 
for different income groups.
21 One of the advantages of an integrated European tax-benefit 
model is that consistent income concepts can be used across countries (see Appendix 3 for a 
definition of the income concept used here). 
 
In Germany, the equalising effect on the income distribution is strongest: Because of the 
continuous tax schedule, the statutory marginal tax rate increases for every DM of taxable 
income earned. In countries with piece-wise linear tax schedules (UK, NL), on the other hand, 
“bracket creep” affects only those parts of taxable income which fall below the lower limit of 
the taxpayer’s tax band. As a result, a larger fraction of the income of high-income groups is 
not affected. In the Netherlands, the tax schedule is steeper than in the UK and the top tax 
band starts at a very high income level. Changes in nominal taxable income have, therefore, a 
larger effect on higher incomes than in the UK, where, compared with the two other countries, 
the top-rate proportional part of the schedule applies to a markedly larger proportion of 
taxpayers. 
 
                                                            
20 A more detailed validation of aggregate simulation results against official figures will form part of the 
EUROMOD project and will shed further light on these issues. 
21 For deriving the income deciles, household disposable incomes have been equivalised using the modified 
OECD equivalence scale. Each household is counted only once (i.e., the households are not weighted by the 
number of persons in them).   11 
Figures 2 and 3 separate the effects of income tax and contributions. Although income tax and 
EESICs are shown separately, the simulations do take into account the interactions between 
the two instruments (e.g., the tax deductibility of contribution payments in Germany and the 
Netherlands). In both Germany and the UK, the change in income taxes relative to the original 
tax burden is clearly much bigger for low incomes. But since income taxes are low for these 
income groups, these changes translate into relatively small changes in disposable incomes 
shown in figure 1. In the UK, the change for the lowest decile is very substantial in relative 
terms. However, refundable tax credits render the average tax burden for this decile negative. 
The relative change would, therefore, also be negative which is why the UK bar is omitted for 
the lowest decile. 
 
A common feature for all three countries is that for very high incomes, tax burdens increase 
by a smaller fraction. For this income group, a large part of their income is located in the 
proportional top rate band so that bracket creep only has a small effect. Also, relative to their 
tax burdens, the value of nominally fixed deductions and tax-free allowances becomes less 
important for these taxpayers. In the Netherlands, the changes of tax burdens are much more 
equally distributed than in the other two countries. One reason is that one important deduction 
(the “professional deduction”) is computed as a percentage of earnings (subject to an upper 
limit). One tax-free allowance (for lone parents) is computed in a similar manner. As a result, 
lower incomes are protected from an inflation induced erosion of these tax concessions, while 
higher income groups suffer tax increases once their inflated incomes cross the relevant upper 
limits. In addition, the point of the first large increase of the marginal tax rate (from 7.1% to 
50%) is significantly further up the income scale than in Germany or the UK. Low-income 
taxpayers are, therefore, less affected by “bracket creep” than those with higher incomes.
22 
 
In principle, the story for the distributive effects resulting from the non-indexation of EESICs 
is rather uniform across all three countries. For low incomes, the important effect is the 
erosion of contribution-free limits, which leads to formerly exempt individuals being dragged 
across these limits where they become liable to pay contributions. For higher incomes, the 
dominating effect is the erosion of upper contribution limits, which decreases the real value of 
the contribution payments. For low-income groups in the Netherlands, the increase in EESICs 
is much larger than that of the income tax burden. Since these income groups also pay larger 
contributions than income taxes, this leads to the relatively strong impact on disposable 
incomes shown in figure 1. In addition, higher income individuals are not liable to pay any 
compulsory health insurance contributions at all. The erosion of the relevant income limit 
contributes further to the substantial decrease in Dutch EESIC burdens shown in figure 3 for 
higher income earners. 
 
5.2.  Actual inflation rates 
 
Starting again with the 1998 data and policy rules, this section looks at what would happen if 
the same inflation rates that prevailed during the 6 years before 1998 were to apply from 1998 
onwards. 
 
                                                            
22 It is worth emphasising that the analysis presented here looks at the household level. It is, therefore, possible 
that taxpayers with very low taxable incomes are located in upper income deciles if the household income as a 
whole is sufficiently high. Appendix 2 shows the distribution of taxable income for individual taxpayers in each 
country (figures 9-11).  12 
Table 2 shows the inflation rates along with the statutory adjustment factors actually applied 
for each year and country (details on which parameters are/are not subject to statutory uprating 
can be found in Appendix 2). Note that the adjustments taken into account for the simulations 
only reflect the statutory uprating factors as outlined in table 2. Any discretionary adjustments 
are ignored because it is not possible to separate inflation adjustments from other objectives of 
discretionary policy measures. Among the three countries considered, only Germany has no 
statutory uprating regime. In the Netherlands, most income tax parameters are uprated based 
on a broad consumer price index, which has been corrected for changes in a number of 
indirect taxes. The uprating factor is calculated as the average index of the 7
th to the 18
th 
month before the tax year divided by the average index of the 19
th to 30
th month before the tax 
year. EESICs depend, in principle, on the amounts of benefits to be paid (i.e., if 
unemployment is down, unemployment insurance contributions decrease, etc.). The 
simulations presented in this paper assume that all income components, including benefits 
increase in line with inflation. I also abstract from any macroeconomic changes or structural 
changes in the population during the period considered here. It, therefore, seems reasonable to 
assume that the parameters of the EESIC rules do also change in line with inflation. In the 
UK, the Retail Price Index is used for adjusting most income tax and EESIC parameters. Here, 
the time period relevant for determining the change in this index is the year to the September 
preceding the tax year.  
 
Table 3 shows the revenue effects of overall inflation across the entire 6-year period. The 
changes are relative to original 1998 revenues. The figures illustrate the problem with 
infrequent inflation adjustments. If, starting from 1998, nominal incomes would rise at the 
same rate as they did between 1992-98, then adjusting income taxes only every 3 years would 
produce an additional tax burden of between 7% and 19% of the 1998 revenue figures. If 
adjustments would be made only after 6 years, the additional revenue generated by bracket 
creep in the meantime would range from around 31% in the UK to more than 63% in The 
Netherlands! The consequences of these rising tax burdens are shown in figure 4. Since 
inflation rates are not too different in the three countries, the results essentially mirror those 
shown earlier for the hypothetical 5% inflation rate (figure 1). Of course, the extents to which 
incomes are reduced are larger than in the hypothetical 5% case. 
 
How well do existing adjustment regimes perform in terms of keeping real tax and EESIC 
burdens constant during times of inflation? Figures 5 to 7 illustrate the simulation results for 
each year of the 6-year period considered here. For each year, they show the change in real 
revenue vis-à-vis the 1998 baseline scenario. For Germany, there is no statutory uprating 
regime. Figure 5 therefore only shows the results of keeping the 1998 rules unchanged. In 
both The Netherlands and the UK, statutory uprating regimes do exist. Due to the time lag 
built into these uprating rules, the degree to which these rules manage to immunise the tax and 
EESIC system against inflationary distortions varies from year to year. Clearly, the deciding 
factor is whether inflation is rising or falling. During times of increasing inflation, the 
adjustments lag behind. As discussed above, the time lag in The Netherlands is much longer 
than in the UK. In addition, the index used for uprating tax rules is different from the 
consumer price index. In the UK “adjusted” scenario, tax revenues increase vis-à-vis the 1998 
benchmark in years 2, 3 and 5 (figure 6). The reverse is true for years 1, 4 and 6, where the 
adjustment factors are larger than inflation. 
 
Turning to figure 7, it may be surprising that the EESIC revenue is falling below the 1998 
level despite the modelling assumption that EESIC rules in The Netherlands are uprated in  13 
parallel with actual inflation (see table 2). The reason for this is an interdependence between 
income tax and People’s Pension contributions which is captured by the model: The base on 
which People’s Pension contributions are computed is identical with the income tax base. Any 
income tax deductions and tax-free allowances are therefore subtracted from the contribution 
base as well. Since the uprating factor used for adjusting income tax rules more than 
compensates for inflation, it follows that the contribution base is reduced by inflated (in real 
terms) deductions and allowances. 
 
Finally, it is interesting that during the entire period and in both countries, real tax revenues 
are lower for the “adjusted” scenario than they were in the 1998 baseline system. Over the 6 
year period, this causes a loss of tax revenues of about 5% (UK) and 11% (NL) of the annual 
1998 revenue (last row of table 3). In both countries, higher income groups benefit more from 
these tax burden reductions than do households further down the income spectrum (figure 8). 
This is consistent with the earlier observation that the real disposable incomes of higher 
income groups are more elastic with respect to price level changes in a non-adjusted tax- and 
contribution system. If, as is the case in both countries during the 6-year period, the 
adjustment factor more than compensates for inflation then it is to be expected that the 
resulting income gains have a regressive impact on the income distribution. 
 
 
6.  Concluding comments 
 
Inflation can alter the characteristics of tax- and contribution systems in numerous ways. This 
paper has used a novel European tax-benefit model to look at the distortions of the tax 
schedule in Germany, The Netherlands and the UK. The integrated framework provided by 
the model permits the use of common income concepts across countries and therefore enables 
one to make informative comparisons of the distributive consequences of the inflation induced 
erosion of tax-band limits, thresholds, deductions, tax credits, etc. In addition, the paper has 
analysed the revenue implications of these distortions and tested the performance of automatic 
indexing regimes used in two of the countries. The following conclusions can be drawn: 
 
·  Real income tax revenues rise and receipts from employee social insurance fall when 
policy rules are not adjusted for inflation. The revenue effects can be very substantial – 
even at the presently prevailing low inflation rates. They depend on the progressivity of 
the underlying tax and contribution schedules and on the extent to which tax and 
contribution rules rely on flat-amount deductions, thresholds, allowances and credits. If 
tax and contribution rules were left unadjusted, Dutch income tax payers would 
experience the largest tax increases. In Germany, where there is no statutory uprating 
regime and where income taxes are relatively more important than in The Netherlands, the 
increase in tax revenues is also large. 
·  Relative to tax liabilities, the tax increases caused by inflation when the income tax rules 
are left unadjusted is largest for low-income groups. The impact on social insurance 
contribution burdens is also regressive. For low incomes, average payments rise because 
lower threshold limits are eroded by inflation. Higher income groups benefit from the 
erosion of upper contribution limits. However, because income taxes and contributions as 
a fraction of disposable income are much smaller for low-income groups, the distributive 
effect in terms of disposable incomes is progressive. 
·  The inflation adjustment regimes used in The Netherlands and the UK are successful in 
counteracting the distortions during times of inflation. However, tax revenues and  14 
contributions can still vary depending on (1) whether inflation rises or falls; (2) the size of 
the time lags built into the adjustment process; and (3) differences between the consumer 
price index and the index used for uprating. In the 1992-1998 period, adjustment factors 
have, on the whole, overstated actual inflation and have, thus, caused slight decreases in 
real income tax revenues. 
 
In the present paper, I have used a preliminary version of EUROMOD for three countries. The 
full EU15 version of the model will permit analysing a wider range of adjustment regimes in 
the context of any of the 15 countries, in particular those which do not currently adjust their 
tax systems for inflation (e.g., Austria, Ireland, Italy) and whose current inflation rates are 
higher than average (e.g., Denmark, Ireland). Also, the ability of EUROMOD to simulate 
benefits as well as direct and indirect taxes permits an extension of the present analysis to 
instruments other than income tax and social insurance contributions. For instance, given the 
increasing reliance on indirect taxes as a revenue source, it would be desirable to include of 
the effects of rising prices on (non-proportional) indirect taxes and the resulting distributive 
effects. Also, the largest number of tax concessions is often available for individuals and 
families who are in danger of social exclusion. Since these concessions frequently come in the 
form of flat-amount deductions, credits, etc., a closer look at the distribution of inflation 
related tax- and contribution changes among different groups of the population, would seem 
important. Groups of interest would include lone parents, pensioners, families with children, 
the disabled, etc. In this context, it would clearly be desirable to consider to what extent 
benefit payments are protected from being eroded by inflation. 
 
Changing economic conditions can affect the characteristics of tax-benefit systems in 
numerous ways. In particular, current and future real economic convergence of European 
economies will frequently cause rapid changes of economic circumstances in individual 
countries. Inflation is only one of the potential channels through which tax-benefit systems 
depend on economic conditions. Other dimensions of economic change to which the present 
analysis could usefully be extended include real income growth, changes in the primary 
income distribution, varying levels of unemployment, and changing demographic 
characteristics including new patterns of family- and household structures. It is hoped that, by 
providing a consistent conceptual framework for analysing different tax-benefit systems, 
EUROMOD will contribute to a better understanding of these issues.  
  15 
Table 1. Change of real tax- and contribution receipts when rules are not adjusted for 
inflation. 
  GE NL  UK 
Inflation  Income Tax
1  EESIC  Income Tax  EESIC  Income Tax  EESIC 
3%  +2.8% -0.3%  +3.8%  -0.6%  +1.8%  -0.3% 
5%  +4.5% -0.6%  +6.3%  -1.1%  +3.0%  -0.5% 
10%  +8.9%  -1.4%  +12.5% -2.3%  +5.9%  -1.0% 
Simulated 1998 
Revenue 
DM 327.8 bn 
 
DM 254.8 bn 
 





DM 301.8 bn  DM 276.8 bn
2  NFL 51.1 bn
  NFL 84.9 bn
  £86.5 bn
3  £22.4 bn
 
Sources: EUROMOD; Bundesministerium für Finanzen, National Accounts (GE);  Statistics Netherlands (NL); 
Inland Revenue, Department of Social Security (UK). 
1 Includes Solidarity Surplus Tax.  
2 Employees only.  
3 Provisional figure. 
 
Table 2. Inflation rates and statutory adjustment factors. 
   Germany  The Netherlands  UK 
1992-93  Inflation
1  4.4% 2.3%  1.4% 
  Income Tax  n/a  3.9% 3.6% 
  EESIC  n/a  2.3% 3.6% 
1993-94  Inflation  2.7% 3.0%  2.4% 
  Income Tax  n/a  2.7% 1.8% 
  EESIC  n/a  3.0% 1.8% 
1994-95  Inflation  1.7% 2.2%  3.2% 
  Income Tax  n/a  2.5% 2.2% 
  EESIC  n/a  2.2% 2.2% 
1995-96  Inflation  1.4% 1.9%  2.7% 
  Income Tax  n/a  2.2% 3.9% 
  EESIC  n/a  1.9% 3.9% 
1996-97  Inflation  1.6% 2.0%  3.7% 
  Income Tax  n/a  1.4% 2.1% 
  EESIC  n/a  2.0% 2.1% 
1997-98  Inflation  1.4% 2.2%  3.1% 
  Income Tax  n/a  1.9% 3.6% 
  EESIC  n/a  2.2% 3.6% 
1 Change in Consumer Price Index over the year preceding the sixth month of the tax year (June in Germany and 
the Netherlands, October in the UK). Source: OECD. 
 
Table 3. Cumulative changes of real revenue – actual inflation rates. 
  GE NL  UK 
  Income Tax  EESIC  Income Tax  EESIC  Income Tax  EESIC 
No Inflation Adjustments       
3 years  +18.6% -2.7%  +19.1%  -3.3%  +7.4%  -1.1% 
6 years  +51.1%  -8.0% +63.8%  -11.7% +31.6% -6.1% 
Actual Statutory Inflation Adjustments       
3 years  n/a  n/a -5.6%  -1.1% -2.9%  +0.5% 
6 years  n/a  n/a -10.9% -2.2%  -5.1%  +0.3% 
Source: EUROMOD  16 
Figure 1. Disposable incomes at the household level – 5% inflation. 
No Inflation Adjustments of Tax and Contribution Rules.














Figure 2. Income taxes at the household level.
1 
 
No Inflation Adjustments of Tax and Contribution Rules: Percentage Change in














1 The change for the lowest decile in the UK is omitted in the graph because the average income tax is negative 
for decile 1 (due to refundable tax credits): The average annual tax burden of this income group increases from 
minus £6.80 to minus £2.70.  17 
Figure 3. Contributions at the household level. 
No Inflation Adjustments of Tax and Contribution Rules: Percentage Change in




















Figure 4. Disposable incomes at the household level – actual inflation. 
Accumulated Inflation 1992-98; No Inflation Adjustments of Tax and Contribution Rules.













Source: EUROMOD  18 
Figure 5. 
GE: Changes in Income Tax and EESIC Revenues






























































GE Income Tax - not adjusted






UK: Changes in Income Tax and EESIC Revenues






























































UK Income Tax - not adjusted
UK Income Tax - adjusted
UK EESICs - not adjusted
UK EESICs - adjusted
 
Source: EUROMOD  19 
Figure 7. 
NL: Changes in Income Tax and EESIC Revenues






























































NL Income Tax - not adjusted
NL Income Tax - adjusted
NL EESICs - not adjusted






Accumulated Inflation 1992-98; Actual Statutory Inflation Adjustments of Tax and Contribution 












Source: EUROMOD  20 
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Simulated  Not Simulated (but included from data) 
Child Benefit  Unemployment Payment 
Federal Education Benefit 
(“Bundeserziehungsgeld”) 
Unemployment Benefit 
Provincial Education Benefit 
(“Landeserziehungsgeld”) 
Military Payment 
Social Assistance ("Sozialhilfe”)  Retraining Payment 
Employee Social Insurance Contributions 
(unemployment, pensions, disability, health) 
Old Age Transition Payment 
Employer Social Insurance Contributions   Own Old Age Pension 
Income Tax  Miners' Pension 
Solidarity Surplus Tax (“Solidaritaetszuschlag”)  Civil Servants' Pension 
  War Victims' Pension 
  Farmers' Pension 
  Accident Pension 
  Widow/Orphan Old-Age Pension 
  Bad Weather Payment / Short-time Benefit 
  Housing benefit (“Wohngeld”)
1 
  Nursing Home Insurance Payment Received 
("Pflegeversicherung") 




Simulated  Not Simulated (but included from data) 
Child Benefit  Basic disability benefit ("AAW") 
Earnings Transfer Allowance  Basic Old Age Pension ("AOW")
1 
Survivor's Benefit ("ANW")  Disability Insurance (former civil servants) 
Social Assistance for the older unemployed and 
disabled unemployed ("IOAW") 
NL Disability Insurance ("WAO") 
 
Social Assistance ("ABW")  Social Assistance for self-employed ("UBZ") 
 
Employee Social Insurance Contributions 
(unemployment, peoples' pensions, health) 
Unemployment Benefit for civil servants 
 
Self Employed' Social Insurance Contributions 
(disability) 
Unemployment Benefit ("WW") 
 
Employer Social Insurance Contribution (health)
23  Sickness Insurance Pay ("ZW") 
  Student Grants/Payments 
Income Tax  Housing Benefit
1 
1 will be simulated in the full version of EUROMOD. 
                                                            
23 This is not part of the output income concept but necessary for computing income tax and peoples' insurance 
contributions. See also appendix 3.  23 
UK 
 
Simulated  Not Simulated (but included from data) 
Child Benefit  Incapacity Benefit 
Family Credit  Invalid Care Allowance 
Income Support  Disability Working Allowance 
Employee National Insurance Contributions  Disability Living Allowance 
Self-Employed National Insurance Contributions  Mobility Allowance 
Income Tax  Severe Disablement Allowance 
  Attendance Allowance 
  Industrial Injury Benefit 
  Retirement Pension 
  War Pension 
  Widow Benefit 
  Unemployment Benefit (Job Seekers Allowance) 
  Statutory Sick Pay 
  Maternity Payments 
  Student Grants/Payments 
  Council Tax Benefit
1 
  Housing Benefit
1 
1 will be simulated in the full version of EUROMOD. 24 





The German income tax schedule is continuous rather than piece-wise linear. Depending on 




Taxable Income (y)  Income Tax 
  < DM 12,366  nil 
  DM 12,366 – DM 58,643  (91.19*(y-12312)/10000 + 2590) * (y-12312)/10000 
  DM 58,644 – DM 120,041  (151.91*(y-58590)/10000 + 3434) * (y-58590)/10000 + 13938 
  > DM 120,041  0.53 * y - 22843 
 
Married couples benefit from (optional) “income splitting”. The income tax itself is the base 
for the so-called “Solidaritätsbeitrag” (solidarity surplus). For the solidarity surplus, a set of 
tax-free allowances applies (these are different for different income sources and not currently 
simulated in EUROMOD). The rate structure itself is linear (in 1998 the rate was 5.5%). 
 
Figure 9. 
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The light grey line in figure 9 shows the cumulative distribution of individuals’ taxable 
income. For a relatively large proportion of individuals, taxable income falls within the zero-
tax band while about 68% of all individuals in the population pay income tax.
24 79% of 
                                                            
24 In cases where couples are eligible for “split” taxation, both partners are counted as paying tax.  25 
taxpayers are in the flatter part of the continuous section of the schedule while 19% are 
located in the steeper part. Only 2% pay the top marginal rate of 53%. 
 
EUROMOD simulates the following components of income tax: 
 
 
  statutory uprating 
Wage Earners Deduction ("Werbungskosten")  no 
Lone Parent Tax Free Allowance ("Haushaltsfreibetrag")  no 
Civil Servants Pension Deduction  no 
Deduction from Investment Income ("Werbungskostenpauschale"; 
"Sparerfreibetrag") 
no 
Old Age Deduction  no 
Expenditure Deduction ("Sonderausgabenabzugsbeträge")  no 
Child Tax Free Allowance  no 
Income Tax Schedule  no 
 
Social insurance contributions are calculated as a fixed percentage of the contribution basis 
(different rates apply in Eastern and Western Germany). Below a certain threshold (again, 
different in Eastern and Western Germany), no contributions are payable. The contribution 
basis is subject to an upper limit. In 1998, the self-employed were not liable to compulsory 










Pension Contributions  10.15% / 10.15%  DM 6,240/7,440  DM 84,000/100,800 
Unemployment Insurance Contribution  3.25% / 3.25%  DM 6,240/7,440  DM 84,000/100,800 
Health Insurance Contribution  7.0% / 6.8%  DM 6,240/7,440  DM 63,000/75,600 
Disability Insurance Contribution  0.85% / 0.85%  DM 6,240/7,440  DM 63,000/75,600 
 
Contribution payments are deductible from the income tax base (as part of the “Expenditure 
Deduction”; certain conditions and limits apply). 
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The Netherlands 
 




Taxable Income  Marginal Rate 
 <  NFL  47,184  7.1% 
  NFL 47,184 – NFL 103,774  50.0% 
  > NFL 103,774  60.0% 
 
In addition, the main tax free allowance amounts to NFL 8,617 per year. The major part of any 
unused tax-free allowances is transferable between spouses. To improve comparability with 
the German schedule, the main tax-free allowance is shown here as a zero-rate tax band 
(figure 10). The distribution of taxable income as shown below is the income before applying 
any tax-free allowances. 
 
Figure 10. 
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According to the simulations, about 64% of the population pay income tax. 3% of taxpayers 
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EUROMOD simulates the following components of income tax: 
 
  Statutory uprating 
Professional Deduction  yes 
Self Employment Deduction  yes 
Life Assurance Premia Deduction  yes 
Mortgage Interest Deduction  n/a 
Old Age Deduction  yes 
General Tax Free Allowance  yes 
Investment Income Tax Free Allowance  no 
Lone Parent Tax Free Allowance  yes 
Income Tax Schedule  yes 
 
Overall Employee Social Insurance Contributions exceed the receipts from income tax 
considerably. Contributions to the “People’s Insurance” form the largest share of the former 
(1998: NFL 68.5 bn
25). People’s contributions cover the basic state pension, the survivors’ 
pension, the disablement pension and exceptional medical expenses. They are paid at a fixed 
percentage subject to an upper contribution limit. Everybody is in principle liable to pay this 
contribution: the base is the same as for income tax (i.e., all deductions and tax free 
allowances apply to the pension contribution base as well). Note that the upper contribution 
limit is equal to the limit of the first income tax bracket. In other words, people’s insurance 
contributions are only paid on taxable income in the first bracket. Different income bases are 
relevant for unemployment, health and disability insurance. For unemployment insurance 
contributions, there is a zero rate band. A fixed percentage is paid only on income exceeding 
this limit. Health insurance contributions are also paid as a fixed percentage of the basis 
(higher rates apply for pensioners). On top of the percentage contribution, a “flat amount” is 
payable. There is an upper contribution limit. In addition, if the contribution basis exceeds an 
“upper income limit” no health insurance contributions are payable at all (high-income 
individuals are assumed to find their own private health insurance). Disability insurance 










People's Insurance Contr.  29.25%  n/a  NFL47,184  n/a  n/a 
Unemployment Insurance 
Contr. 
6.35% base<NFL27,144  NFL78,561  n/a  n/a 
Health Insurance Contr.  1.20%  n/a  NFL52,983  NFL62,200  NFL216 
Disability Insurance Contr.  7.9%  base<NFL29,000  NFL84,000  n/a  n/a 
 
Only unemployment and disability insurance contributions are deductible from the income tax 
base (and, consequently, the contribution base of People’s Pension contributions). 
                                                            
25 Source: Statistics Netherlands.  28 
UK 
 




Taxable Income  Marginal Rate 
 <£4,301  20.0% 
  £4,301 – £27,100  23.0% 
 >  £27,100  40.0% 
 
In addition there are several tax credits (tax reduction for investment income, lone parent 
allowance, married couples allowance, mortgage interest rate supplement). A basic tax-free 
allowance of £4,195 per year is available to all taxpayers. To improve comparability with the 
German schedule, the main tax-free allowance is shown here as a zero-rate tax band (figure 
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Only 42% of individuals pay income tax. Relative to the other two countries, there is a much 
larger proportion (7.6%) of taxpayers who pay the top rate (which is markedly lower than in 
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EUROMOD simulates the following components of income tax: 
 
  statutory uprating 
Main Tax Free Allowance  Yes 
Age Related Tax Free Allowance  Yes 
Income Tax Schedule  Yes 
Tax reduction for investment income in 
second tax band 
Yes 
Lone Parent Allowance  Yes 
Married Couples Allowance  Yes 
Mortgage Interest Rate Supplement  No 
 
For employee social insurance contributions in the UK, there is no differentiation according to 
the purpose of the insurance. However, it is possible to “opt out” of the State Earnings Related 
Pension Scheme (SERPS), in which case lower rates apply. Different rules apply for the self-
employed. If the base does not exceed a certain limit (limit2 below) then only a flat amount is 
payable. In addition, for the part of the base, which exceeds the limit, a percentage 
contribution applies. For both employee and self-employed contributions, there is a lower 






Rate on amount 
above limit 




Employees £64  10% 
(plus 2% of 64) 
8.4% 







Amount if above 
lower limit1 




Self-employed £64  £6.35  £140.58  6%  £485 
 
In the UK, social insurance contributions are not tax deductible. 
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Appendix 3. Disposable Income Definition used for the purpose of this paper. 
 
For the current exercise we use the following definition of household disposable income: 
wage and salary income (including sick pay paid by government), plus self-employment 
income, plus property income (rent, dividends, interest), plus other cash market income and 
occupational pension income (regular private transfers, alimony and child maintenance), plus 
cash benefit payments (social insurance, disability, universal and social assistance benefits, 
including state pension payments and near-cash benefits), minus direct taxes and social 
insurance contributions, as defined in (Atkinson et al., 1995, Table 2.1). 
 
Components that are not part of our output income concept include imputed rent from owner 
occupation, the value of home production, other non-cash incomes, unrealised capital gains or 
losses, the value of credit or loans (repayments and interest payments are not deducted) and 
irregular lump sum incomes (regular bonuses are included). Employer contributions are 
neither added nor deducted. Forms of "committed expenditure" such as housing costs, child 
maintenance, alimony payments, etc. are not deducted. 